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The Diplomatic Recognition of Croatia 1992 must be seen as the keystone to the recognition
of Croatia. The subsequent recognition by other states
was only a logical consequence of the European
Twelve's consensus-based decision.
The United States, it should be noted, had al-
ready announced officially that it would stand by any
decision by the European Community with regard to
recognizing Croatia - and thus on the fate of
Yugoslavia's unity - no matter what that decision
might be. Actually, the United States decided to rec-
ognize Croatia only on April 7, 1992, that is after con-
siderable delay, and just one day before Croatia,
Slovenia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina were to be accepted
as full-fledged members in the United Nations.
As noted already, with the establishment of the
Conference on Yugoslavia under the aegis of the Eu-
ropean Community, it was understood that the final
result of the Conference would be to grant diplomatic
recognition to those repub-
lics of the former SFRY
which desired it. The course
of events, however, was to
proceed in a different and
unplanned manner, due to
the onslaught by the
Yugoslav Army (that is by
Serbia and Montencgro)
against Croatia, which invol-
ved the use of tanks, aircraft,
warships, and surface-to-
surface missiles, despite the
repeated cease-fires on
which the European Com-
munity insisted as expressed
through its mission in
Croatia.
The world, and espe-
cially Europe, was shocked
by the brutality of the aggres-
sion against Croatia, and
Germany now took the lead
in promoting the position
that recognizing Croatia
could reduce the level ofvio-
lence of those attacks and
put a stop to the aggression.
In addition to the factors al-
ready mentioned which en-
The disintegration or collapse of Yugoslavia
was well underway. With the August 27, 1991 resolu-
tion by the European Twelve (with the agreement of
all the republics and the federal government of the
former Yugoslavia who were participating in the con-
ference), Yugoslavia de [acto became a state under
international trusteeship. Yugoslavia thereby achieved
a unique distinction in the history of international re-
lations, since normally the states that are emerging as
independent entities are placed under the tutorship of
international organizations, while in the case of Yu-
goslavia it was the latter's passing away which was
occurring when Yugoslavia became under an interna-
tional protectorate. This situation was confirmed by
United Nations Security Council Resolution 713.
In tandem with this, Croatia's international le-
gal identity was also devel-
oping apace, beginning on
June 25, 1991. By the very
act of passing its Declaration
of Independence that day,
Croatia achieved its deJacto
recognition, followed
quickly by political recogni-
tion when the European
Community sent its delega-
tion on June 28, 1991 to
Zagreb to meet with the lead-
ers of Croatia and Slovenia.
Final diplomatic recognition
was only of a declamatory
nature.
The mutual recogni-
tion between Croatia and
Slovenia as soon as they had
proclaimed their indepen-
dence marked the beginning
of this process of diplomatic
recognition. Soon thereafter,
Latvia, the Ukraine, and
Lithuania were to recognize
Croatia, to be followed by
Iceland. Nevertheless, the
diplomatic recognition ex-
tended by the European
Community on January 15,
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abled Germany - along with Austria and the Vatican
- to take a positive stand before others did on recog-
nizing Croatia, there were also other even more im-
portant factors:
l.The world was impressed by the willingness
of the Croatians, and especially of the younger gen-
eration, to take up arms and to stand up to a militarily
much stronger adversary.
2.The world was shocked by the brutality with
which the aggressor attacked and destroyed Croatia's
cities and villages, killing and expelling the civilian
population, and plundering.
3.Initially, Germany sought to gain the support
of the rest of the European Community through infor-
mal contacts at a time when consultations among the
European Community's foreign ministers were espe-
cially intensive in preparation for the Maastricht Con-
ference. To be clear, the Maastricht Conference held
on December 9-10, 1991, turned out to be a major
disappointment for Croatian public opinion, since the
Croatian issue was not even mentioned on the
conference's official agenda. However, what the con-
ference did establish was in fact that the member states
should adopt a common position on matters of defence
and foreign policy. This was to be a decisive factor in
the European Community meeting held a week later
in Brussels.
The European Community Makes A Decision
Despite the request which de Cuellar and Baker
sent in writing to Genscher and the one Bush sent to
Kohl on December 15, 1991 for Germany not to rush
unilaterally into recognizing Croatia and Slovenia - a
request intended to moderate Germany's known in-
tention to do so - these demarches by the Secretary
General of the United Nations and by the President of
the United States did not have any effect, since
Genscher was able to deflect such warnings and ap-
proaches skilfully.
At Genscher's initiative, a discussion of a "list
of conditions" for the recognition of new states - or
more exactly a declaration of procedures for the rec-
ognition of new states in Eastern Europe and the So-
viet Union - was placed on the agenda of the Confer-
ence on Yugoslavia. The draft of this document had
been worked out already by France and Germany, and
contained the criteria which individual countries
would have to fulfil in order to meet the precondi-
tions for diplomatic recognition. The foreign minis-
ters quickly reached agreement on these criteria, based
on the text of the above-mentioned declaration, a de-
cision which followed naturally from the reports of
the Arbitration Commission of the European
Community's Conference on Yugoslavia. Slovenia and
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Croatia already met those criteria and following small
adjustments the only question that remained was when
diplomatic recognition would follow.
Lord Carrington, however, was strongly op-
posed to an early recognition, and firmly believed that
at that moment conditions were not ripe yet and that
the necessary preconditions for the recognition of
Slovenia and Croatia had not been met yet i.e. in De-
cember 1991. In other words, he still adhered to the
European Community's earlier position that recogni-
tion for Slovenia and Croatia should be coordinated
with the outcome of the Conference on Yugoslavia.
Great Britain's Foreign Minister, Douglas Hurd, was
somewhat less adamant, but he was also convinced
that recognition was still premature. Allied to
Genscher on this question were Denmark's Foreign
Minister Ellernann-Jensen and Belgium's Eyskens.
France's Foreign Minister Roland Dumas did not take
an openly opposing stand, but emphasized instead the
need to understand Germany's position. At that meet-
ing, Italy's de Michelis, who up to then routinely had
taken a favourable stand toward Belgrade, warned
(possibly influence by Cossiga and by Andreotti's re-
thinking) that the European Community's credibility
was being undermined by the Serbs' ignoring of its
positions and warnings. De Michelis took the posi-
tion that an end had to be put to this situation, and that
this could be accomplished by granting recognition
to Croatia and Slovenia. In particular, de Michelis
stressed that all the European Community members
had to agree unanimously on a decision on recogni-
tion. Van den Broek (as the President of the European
Community's Council of Ministers - a position which
rotated every six months) - also accepted this posi-
tion, as he was especially irritated by Belgrade's du-
plicity. Specifically, the Serbian-dominated Yugoslav
Army on several occasions had signed cease-fire
agreements and had promised not to shell civilian tar-
gets. Contrary to the commitments already undertaken
the Yugoslav Army continued its attacks and seizure
of territory undeterred. The attacks on Vukovar, Slunj,
Drnis, Zadar, Karlovac, Osijek, and Dubrovnik re-
vealed the true nature of the Yugoslav Army's out-of-
control leadership and had a profound impact on Van
den Broek's views.
Thanks to the principles announced in
Maastricht mandating a united approach on foreign
policy matters for members of the European Commu-
nity a consensus was achieved on December 17, 1991
on diplomatic recognition of Croatia and Slovenia. It
is natural and to be expected that differences could
arise in the assessments and positions of twelve inde-
pendent countries, especially when the focus of such
differences was only on the appropriate moment to
provide Croatia and Slovenia with protection and the
satisfaction of a diplomatic recognition from such a
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respected group of countries. Indeed, it would be more
surprising if such differences did not exist, especially
given the different experience, level of knowledge,
and interpretation of the nature and cause of the con-
flicts which appeared generally as the tyranny of Com-
munism collapsed in Europe.
However, it is more difficult to understand how
countries such as Great Britain and France, with a
wealth of experience in foreign affairs, left room for
speculation, doubt and criticism surrounding the dip-
lomatic recognition of Croatia. That is, after having
weighed all the pros and cons, France and Great Brit-
ain agreed to recognize Croatia, but it seems that they
should not have allowed the impression to develop in
European public opinion that the decision had been
taken against their advise and even their will, and that
they had agreed only under German pressure.
On the contrary it is abundantly clear that both
France and Great Britain had viewed the decision to
recognize Croatia as both justified and appropriate.
Based on that premise, these two countries' experi-
enced diplomatic corps should have used the strength
of their authority to prevent the Belgrade regime from
avoiding blame for its defeat before its own people by
using such false excuses. France and Great Britain had
an obligation to prevent paranoia in the Serbian me-
dia from having a field day by distorting history and
claiming that Croatia had achieved its independence
solely thanks to German revanchism aimed against
Serbia, and that this represents a new German thrust
toward the East, that Serbia's traditional allies in two
world wars had betrayed it and that Serbia was a vic-
tim of German economic expansion. Since such dis-
tortions have fertile ground in Serbia, Great Britain
and France should not have granted to Milosevic such
a favour and, at the same time such a disservice to the
Serbian people.
The subsequent flow of events suggests that
Great Britain and France should have sent Belgrade a
direct message that the diplomatic recognition of
Croatia was a direct consequence of the aggression
and policy of force which the JNA and Milosevic's
Serbia had implemented systematically against
Croatia. Such a move would have put a stop to Serbia's
exploitation of the "precani" Serbs and would have
ended the hold of Milosevic's propaganda over the
Serbian masses.
The Ultimate Affirmation of Statehood
In the weeks following Croatia's recognition by
the European Community, recognition also followed
by many other countries, begining with Austria, Hun-
gary, Switzerland, Canada, the Scandinavian and Latin
American countries, Australia, and New Zealand, and
included countries on all continents. With that,
Croatia's legal existence as a state was confirmed ir-
revocably and for all times.
After the end of the Cold War, the United States
remained as the sole superpower. However, the United
States was to take the initiative commensurate with
its role and importance only in those areas where
American national interests are at stake. It sounds
eminently logical when President William Clinton says
that the United States does not want to be the world's
policeman. However, being the sole superpower does
not mean simply having more rights; it means at the
same time also having more responsibilities. It is also
understandable that the preconditions (were not for)
the United States' sending its boys to die in some
Balkan valley. Nevertheless, by the same token, the
impression was created that the United States was not
only tolerating but encouraging aggression. Such ac-
tions as the parading of the Sixth Fleet in the Adriatic,
stationing the most modem aircraft a few minutes'
flying time away from the combat zones, patrolling
the air space over Bosnia-Herzegovina to monitor the
"No Fly Zone" (even though the Serbian air force has
violated that air space hundreds of times), as well as
the reinforcement provided indirectly by its public
declarations, suggest such an intent. That is, how was
Serbia to interpret the statements and warnings by
official spokesmen that the United States viewed that
its own national interests would be at risk if violence
began against Macedonia or Kosovo? In Belgrade, the
conclusion to be drawn was that, therefore, Croatia
and Bosnia-Herzegovina were outside the United
States' defence perimeter and that "we have a free
hand to use violence there and seize as much land as
we can."
This state of inertia, agony violence, and war
has lasted too long. Ambassador Warren Zimmerman,
Secretary of State James Baker and, in particular, Un-
der Secretary of State Lawrence Egleburger squan-
dered valuable time before they understood that
Milosevic, the butcher of the Balkans, was hurtling
the peoples of the former Yugoslavia, and perhaps
beyond, into the maelstrom of war.
It must also be noted that the military power
which Belgrade was able to build up over decades
made the Yugoslav Army the third or fourth largest in
Europe, and the United States cannot deny its part in
creating that oversized armed force, which was sup-
plied with an arsenal of modem weaponry. It was that
armed force which swooped down on the very people
it had supposedly been designed to protect, while au-
diences across Europe, the United States, and around
the world watched in horror. Finally, the principal fi-
nancial infusions enabling the Yugoslav Communist
dictatorship to survive came from the other side of
the Atlantic.
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It is instructive to also remember the decisive
and courageous statement that President Ronald
Reagan directed to the Soviets during the first days of
his first term in office, that is when the Cold War was
still raging and, perhaps, was at its very zenith. That
statement went something like this: "The Soviets are
prepared to lie, bluff, kill, and commit any crime in
order to achieve their goals," Milosevic, General Ratko
Mladic, and those like them who were weaned on the
same Soviet ideology undoubtedly deserve the same
approach as was used with the Soviets. If Reagan was
so successful against the Soviets using this approach,
Bush would surely have also been successful with
Milosevic.
Despite a long and consequence-laden delay,
policymakers in the U.S. eventually arrived at the con-
clusion that Milosevic and Karadzic are war crimi-
nals and that they would have to answer for war crimes
committed in the former Yugoslavia. Yet, surprisingly,
Croatian policy was slow to respond to this clearly
positive initiative.
What is at stake, ultimately, is the credibility of
the European Community, the United Nations, and of
the only remaining superpower, the United States. Can
their prestige be restored, in light of the fact that after
many months they still have not been able to cut off
oil supplies to Serbia completely? It is sad to realize
that if Serbia's oil had been cut off immediately when
the United Nations sanctions were imposed, the de-
structive war and the civilian population's suffering
in this region would have ended long ago. Despite the
US's international role, significance, and power, the
latter has accepted in a surprisingly casual manner the
fundamental principle of a sort of Manroe Doctrine
as applied to the territories of the former Soviet Union.
That is, other powers should not interfere in those ar-
eas that once formed part of the Soviet Union. Indeed,
Russia's hegemony is tolerated and accepted even
though there is no guarantee (or even likelihood) that
totalitarianism, absolutism, and autocracy will disap-
pear in Russia. For Moscow, the key concern is to pro-
mote those forces in neighbouring states which favour
greater direct political, economic, and state links of
dependency with Russia. Even now, many Orthodox
Communists enjoy Moscow's support as they com-
pete against democratic movements if the latter move-
ments are seen to promote independence or autonomy
from Russia. This short-sighted perspective of Russia
should be of concern because it is very probable that
the current economic and political crisis in Russia -
which is the result of the breakdown of the Commu-
nist system - will abate and that Russia will recover
in due course.
One has to remember that in Russia neither the
beginnings nor the preconditions for democracy to de-
velop have ever existed, despite the fact that society
has produced many world-class philosophers, artists,
and activists working for human and national rights,
social justice, and tolerance. However, the Orthodox
ethos and belief system incline toward absolute rule,
and the opportunity to prevent the development of a
new mastodon in Eastern Europe will probably be lost
soon, to the detriment of the U.S. and the European
Union. A giant will arise again in the East. Because
of its nature and essence, this giant will always be
governed by absolutists and dictators. Bolstered by
revived ideologies and utopias, and exploiting mis-
understandings and crimes, this giant could become
the dominant superpower in the Balkans. Contrary to
the U.S., Russia will always consider the entire
Balkans to be a vital national interest, even without
making any provocative declarations to that effect.
Ultimately, what the West and the United States
have failed to understand about Milosevic's Serbia is
that Milosevic has only changed the name of his Com-
munist Party, while, under the new clothing the old
Bolshevik structure, contents, ideology, methods, and
totalitarian machinery have survived unchanged.
I am inclined to agree with Michael Kramer
who, in seeking to define the Clinton Doctrine, wrote
in Time magazine that Clinton justifies his retreats eu-
phemistically as "pragmatism". As a result, Kramer
warned, America must worry about becoming a pris-
oner of self induced impotence which, perhaps, will
be how the "Clinton Doctrine" will be remembered in
history. The United States' performance in the
Yugoslav crisis up to middle of August 1995 has been
less than adequate for the world's only superpower.
In view of the importance and the number of
Muslim states in Africa and Asia, the Security Coun-
cil and the USA Administration began to realise that
the USA as the only world super power should not
remain passive regarding the war horrors in Bosnia -
Herzegovina. During 1993/94 USA finally took the
initiative which resulted first with the Washington
Agreement and then the Dayton Agreement. It has to
be said that as early as 1993 Washington initiated the
gathering of support among the allies in Europe, fist
of all Great Britain and France, to stop the Serbian
aggression by using superior military power in the air
and on the sea.
The Pentagon prepared the strategy called "lift
and destroy "which involved imposing the no-fly zone
and destroying the Serbian military potential in Bosnia.
However, while touring the European capitals in the
attempt to gather support the US Secretary of State
Warren Crhistopher failed dismally.
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The Confirmation of the Croatian Integrity
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By attaching high value and respect to all rel-
evant UN Security Council resolutions, Croatia had
the right to expect that despite the years of shelling
and armed conflict in the neighbouring Bosnia -
Herzegovina, "the Safe Areas" as declared by the UN,
would be protected and maintained. The Safe Areas
included Sarajevo, Tuzla, Bihac, Srebrenica, Gorazde
and Zepa. The obligations and guarantees taken from
the UN Security Council and the international com-
munity were not respected and the ruthless endanger-
ing of the civil population in the urban communities
continued. A special envoy of the UN Secretary Gen-
eral, Mr. Akashi, tried in vain to stop the Serb para-
military forces from attacking the Safe Area of Bihac
from the Croatian territory, the part of which was then
occupied.
However, the war criminals Karadzic and
Mladic together with their Serb patrons in Belgrade,
continued with ruthless and callous violence and eth-
nic (cleansing) extermination. The tragic fate of the
population of the Safe Areas in Bosnia - Herzegovina
at the beginning of the summer 1995 reached its cul-
mination in genocidal violence of catastrophic pro-
portions suffered by the whole population of
Srebrenica and Zepa in July 1995 and passively ob-
served and tolerated by the UNPROFOR and the whole
of the international community. Shocking scenes of
women, children and the old leaving, not of their own
will, but because they were forced to do so, i.e. ethnic
cleansing gained new momentwn. Those examples fi-
nally proved the indecisiveness and ineffectiveness
of the UNPROFOR.
At the beginning of August of 1995 it was up
to the uncontrollable self-will of the war criminals
Karadzic and Mladic to decide either whether to con-
tinue with their crimes in Bihac or to concentrate on
Gorazde or to do it all at the same time. Judging from
the circumstances prevailing at the time that is pre-
cisely what would have happened hadn't Croatia mili-
tarily intervened.
Acting in accordance with its constitutional ob-
ligations and indisputable commitment of the Croatian
people and all Croatian citizens in protecting the sov-
ereignty and territorial integrity of their state, in order
to start liberating the occupied parts ofBanovina, Lika
and northern Dalmatia, Croatia at the same time had
the obligation to prevent further humanitarian trag-
edy developing for the population of the Cazin area
and Bihac. The basic human rights of the inhabitants
of these areas were critically abused and they were
brought to the edge of existence by suffering from star-
vation, lack of water and in particular of medicine. It
could and should not be passively observed any longer
as it represented not only the abuse of human rights
but literally of the right to live of over one hundred
thousand men, women and children.
Under such circumstances and particularly as
a result of the inefficiency of UNPROFOR and Carl
Buildt's wrong estimates and behaviour, the action
"Storm" took place. The Croatia defenders stopped
further escalation of violence and systematic ethnic
cleansing of the population. Although there was sup-
port in UN resolutions in writing and spirit, Croatia
reached the whole of the border line with Bosnia -
Herzegovina by using its own forces. It has to be
pointed out that the operation "Storm" opened the way
for the NATO air strike intervention in Bosnia -
Herzegovina which followed and created the condi-
tions for Dayton. With the operation "Storm" Croatia
actually saved the population of Gorazde and Bihac.
Acting in accordance with the Article 51 of the
UN Charter and using its own forces Croatia turned
away the rebels from its territory in Banovina, north-
west Lika and the nothern part of Dalmatia. With the
same police-military operation "Storm" Croatia saved
the Bihac and Cazin area as well as Gorazde. The ob-
ligations taken by Europe, the NATO and the UN re-
garding these areas were carried out by Croatia.
In doing so Croatia not only stopped the hor-
rendous suffering of the already long suffering popu-
lation in the neighbouring Bosnia - Herzegovina, but
also saved the reputation of the UN Security Council.
Certain incidents that took place in the occu-
pied areas of Croatia from whitch the terrorists were
driven away deserve criticism and condemnation.
Croatia has an obligation to view them as such in or-
der to prove that it is often unjustly put in the same
category as the aggressors. Perfection, however, is
rarely found in this world.
Let me conclude by saying that all of this cre-
ated conditions for the NATO military attack on the
Serbian military targets in Bosnia - Herzegovina which
soon followed. Following the UN Security Council
resolutions NATO finally used the only language that
Belgrade understood - the language of military force.
Milosevic finally agreed to halt the war terror and sub-
sequently realized that it would be unavoidable to sit
down at the negotiating table at Dayton.
Territorial Integrity
Territory in addition to population and govern-
ing bodies is one of the three main determinants of
any state. Territory of a state is defined by state bor-
ders on which the state sovereignty is
extended. Borders are lines which define a state area
and can also be defined as an uneven line which
crosses the surface of land mass. Consequently, bor-
ders extend underground as well as into the air and
also cover the area of the sea surface, the sea bed and
beneath the sea bed.
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As far as the border problems of Croatia are
concerned, it has to be emphasised that there are not
either towards Slovenia or towards Serbia or
Montenegro any hamlets or villages that would be a
matter of dispute. However, there is still work to be
done on establishing Croatian borders with its
neighbours on the sea.
The integration of the Croatian Danube region,
has been accomplished.
Similarly, in the most south-eastern part of
Croatia, at the Cape Ostro, where the UN observers
are still present with the mandate of the UN Security
Council resolutions on Prevlaka, there are certain re-
strictions preventing the Croatian authorities from car-
rying out their duties unhindered. However, that does
not essentially impinge on the territorial integrity of
the Republic of Croatia which was clearly stated in
the UN resolutions. The latest UN resolutions on
Prevlaka explicitly state that "The Security Council
confirms once again its obligation to protect the inde-
pendence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the
Republic of Croatia."
Over the last years Prevlaka has received a lot
of publicity in the international community, although
the cape Ostro or as it is most commonly called
Prevlaka, as a territory does not physically touch the
land border between Croatia and the FRY within the
straits leading into the Bay of Boka-Kotorska.
The land border between Croatia and
Montenegro goes along the mountainous rocks on
Bjelotina and Dracevica above the eastern part of
Konavle, while on the shore the border comes out on
"Konflin", in the area of the cape Kobila which is not
part of Prevlaka. The whole 25 km land border has
been bilaterally established with great precision and
as such have been respected for centuries.
Despite the fact that the Agreement on the
Normalisation of Relations between Croatia and Yu-
goslavia was signed on 23 August 1996, basic pre-
condition for the real development of the relations in
the border area of the two neighbouring countries is
the establishing of the Croatia border guards on both
Bjelotina and Dracevica along the border line which
is the internationally recognised border.
It is important to stress that in October 1991 the
Parliament of Montenegro has used the term "the ex-
isting border" for this particular border. That was in
June 1991 after the NATO's Political Department in its
working paper entitled "Europe's Lebanon", which re-
ferred to the areas of the SFRY, of that time had been
preparing its members, recalling the principles stated
in the Helsinki Final Act and the Paris Charter, that
Slovenia and Croatia should be recognised, as well as
any other republic that proclaims its independence
within the borders established after the World War II.
Croatia shows the adherence to the peaceful co-
operation with its neighbours in its determination to
build a marina for yachts within the area of the
Prevlaka Bay which in addition to the tourist facili-
ties would stretch over the whole area of the Cape
Ostro. On the very top of the Cape, in the fortress built
during the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, building of
memorial museum is planned in order to commemo-
rate all the defenders of the Croatian youth killed dur-
ing the Homeland War as well as the innocent victims
sent to their deaths in the attacks on Risanj and
Ledenice in Boka Kotorska in the autumn of 1944.
There is a real ground for hope that this initia-
tive, which aims at creating tourist facilities in this
deserted area of the Croatian most southern part of
the coast, will result in a positive reaction from our
eastern neighbour. The Montenegrin Government has
already submitted the Plans for the Regional Devel-
opment for the whole of Montenegro were submitted
to the Parliament of Montenegro, but the plans did
not include the Prevlaka area i.e. the Cape Ostro.
The imperatives of the economic recovery for
Boka Kotorska and whole coastal area of Montenegro
are to be found in tourism which has no chance of
further development unless it gives up for good its
territorial aspirations, i.e. unless the peaceful inten-
tions prevail with our neighbours as well. Many of
the Croatian south-eastern neighbours have realised
that any concessions on the Croatian part either on
the land or on the sea, would mean a reward for the
aggression.
Croatia is approaching a final agreement on
open questions regarding the borders with the
neighbouring Slovenia. Along the whole of 670 km
land border which stretches from three-border point
with Hungary to the estuary of the river Dragonja in
the Bay of Piran, the geodesist experts with their ex-
perience and professionalism, have done a great
amount of work. In several open and unresolved ar-
eas the final solutions are gaining shape and it can be
expected that they would be acceptable for both coun-
tries. A long part of the land border goes along the
rivers Mura, Sutla, Kupa and Dragonja which makes
the situation considerably simpler, easier. However,
the change of course of these rivers over the last sev-
eral decades has called for certain coordination. That
job is in its final phase and that can explain the pa-
tience on the Croatian side regarding the actual situa-
tion on St. Gera, mountain.
Solution of the border disputes between
Slovenia and Croatia is made easier by the Constitu-
tional decisions both countries made upon gaining
their independence. On 25th June 1991 the same view
on mutual recognition and respect of borders which
existed in the former SFRY was accepted. Therefore,
the task of diplomatic commissions of the two coun-
tries is to establish bilaterally the factual situation
which existed in June of 1991. So far the progress
made in this area has been encouraging. •
